

# Teacher Incentives: Evidence from Schools in Delhi

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All the interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions with whom we interacted during the course of this study.

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## Abstract

The paper reports on existing incentive structures in a sample of government and private schools in Delhi and elicits teachers' perspectives on factors which motivate them. It is found that performance-related pay and promotions are important monetary incentives for teachers. Recognition, regular evaluation and monitoring and contractual based employment are found to be important non-monetary incentives. Having a large class size, having to teach subjects outside of a teacher's expertise and performing clerical duties are found to be some significant disincentives for teachers.

## 1. Introduction

Education is the backbone of a society; it determines the current position of an economy in the world and shapes the coming future. In emerging economies, the importance of education has motivated discussion and deliberation on ways to improve the quality of education imparted. In this light, this paper seeks to examine the incentive structures in teaching in schools in Delhi. The paper explores how these may be improved to enhance the quality of education for those on the receiving end by interviewing teachers and principals in government and private schools.

The paper first outlines the findings of recent studies on teacher incentives and student performance in Section 2. The methodology employed in this study is explicated in Section 3. Section 4 describes the incentive structure currently in place and Section 5 reports the findings on teachers' perceptions of the impediments to teach. Section 6 subsequently discusses policy implications and recommendations and Section 7 contains the conclusion of the paper.

## 2. Literature Review

Teacher absenteeism is a matter of concern in India, especially in government primary schools. It is one of the crucial obstacles to overcome in order to improve education and beckons for a framework of incentives that can firstly, lower teacher absenteeism and secondly, increase teaching effort. This is highlighted in a paper by Chaudhury et al. (2004), which found teacher absenteeism to be at a disconcerting rate of 25 percent in government primary schools and also reported that at the time of unannounced visits, only 50 percent of the teachers present were teaching.

Subsequently efforts have been made to understand the link between different forms of teacher incentives and student performance. Monetary incentives such as bonuses, performance-linked payments, increments in salary and allowances have sometimes worked well in motivating teachers. Non-monetary incentives such as an effective monitoring system, recognition, career progression and professional development also appear promising.

In the past, the use of bonus payments linked to improvement in test scores have been shown to be effective in improving the performance of children. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009) used data from Andhra Pradesh Randomised Evaluation Study (APRESt) to substantiate this. In another study in 2010, they found that monitoring without any repercussions is not very successful in improving student performance. Nevertheless, when this was implemented

alongside performance-related pay, there was an improvement in test scores. This suggests that although the diagnostic feedback provided useful information on performance of students and gave suggestions for improving teaching, this was only effectively used when combined with monetary incentives. The authors conclude that teacher incentive programs were three times as cost effective in raising test scores as raising school inputs.

A link between attendance and pay has also been hypothesised. Findings by Duflo and Hana (2005), based on 60 one-teacher NFEs (non-formal educational centres) in rural India that were part of a randomised trial to test this, show positive results. The teachers were required to work for 21 days in a month for which they received a base monthly salary of INR 1,000. They were given a bonus of INR 50 for each additional day they attended and incurred a fine of INR 50 for each of the 21 days that they did not attend work with the fine being capped at INR 500. The program involved clicking photographs of the teacher at the beginning and end of the school day by a student using a camera with tamper-proof date and time function. The paper finds that implementing this scheme increased attendance in treatment schools and this positively affected student achievement levels. Given that the program had an immediate and long lasting effect in treatment schools, the use of a straightforward external monitoring and incentive scheme to reduce teacher truancy was advocated. However, it was noted that since government school teachers are politically more powerful, they may resist such a system of monitoring.

Apart from the monetary and non-monetary incentives, employment terms can also influence the quality of the teachers attracted to this job. Government and private schools can be contrasted on this front as they reward different aspects when recruiting teachers. Whilst a permanent job contract is a reward in the private sector, it is not so in the government sector because of the government regulations that qualify a teacher's job as permanent by default. Kingdon and Teal (2002) note that teacher quality—as indicated by the variables of average grade the teacher obtained in board examinations and degrees, number of classes he/she teaches, whether the subject that he/she teaches matches his/her specialisation and whether examinations were taken by him as a regular candidate (i.e. not privately)—was rewarded in private but not in government schools. Teacher experience, however, was rewarded in government but not private schools. The paper reports that student achievement was higher in the private sector and the autonomy of school managers to determine pay and fire teachers (who are not fulfilling their job requirements) was the explanatory factor behind this.

The nature of the contract for teachers can also act as an incentive or a disincentive. Recent literature has examined the involvement of contract teachers, aka para teachers, in education and points favourably to employing teachers on a contractual basis. There has been a rise of hiring teachers on a contractual basis in India. There were about 538,000 contractual-teachers

in 2012-13, comprising 7.2 percent of the total teachers.<sup>1</sup> These contract teachers are hired locally, have fixed term renewable contracts, are not professionally trained and are paid much lower salaries, around a fifth of that of regular civil service teachers. Using a randomised evaluation trial in Andhra Pradesh, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013) found that schools that received an extra contract teacher had significantly better performance than those that did not. They advocate developing a career ladder where pay rise, bonus and promotion to civil service rank conditioned on performance can be used to incentivise and retain teachers.

This has been supported by Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao (2010) through their finding that although the minimum teaching qualification requirements for contract teachers are lower than that of regular teachers, they tend to be better qualified and the performance of students taught by them was not significantly lower than those taught by regular teachers.

On the international front, parallels can be drawn between hiring practices in India and Kenya. Decisions of hiring, primarily based on teacher qualification, and firing are made centrally by the Ministry of Education in Kenya similar to the government sector of education in India.<sup>2</sup> Total teacher compensation in Kenya is as high as five times the per capita income of the country.<sup>3</sup> Glewwe et al. (2003) used a randomised evaluation of a program that provided primary school teachers in Kenya with incentives based on students' test scores. They found that whilst this improved the test scores during the course of the program, the effects were not persistent once the program was discontinued, as it did not usher in attitudinal or pedagogical change. The paper rightly identifies one of the dangers of using performance based pay viz. teachers increasing their efforts in the short term only, directing it towards preparation for the test as opposed to improving long run learning. This has been referred to as 'teaching to the test' in the literature.

Overall, the literature points to the fact that certain types of incentives may be successfully employed to elicit greater effort from teachers.

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<sup>1</sup> (Elementary Education in India: Where do we stand? State Report Cards 2012-13 n.d.)

<sup>2</sup> (Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer 2003)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

## 3. Methodology

### 3.1 Purpose of the Study

Existing literature does not comment extensively on how employment terms for a teacher can act as incentives or disincentives. With the objective of the paper to develop a holistic understanding of the types of incentives needed to keep teachers motivated, the paper incorporates teachers' views on what would facilitate teaching. The results of this paper are based on primary research that was undertaken over the course of a month. This comprised telephonic and in-person interviews with teachers and principals. Two questionnaires were designed for this purpose; one for the teachers and another for the principal/head teacher, both of which are attached in the annexure.

Schools in India can be classified, depending on the management and sources of funding, as being either government, government-aided or private. The first category describes the schools that are run and fully funded by the government and in which students are not required to pay tuition fees or any charges for uniform or text books. This includes Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) schools which usually provide primary schooling from first to fifth standard and secondary schools which teach up to twelfth standard. Government-aided schools receive a large percentage of their funding from the government with the remaining being funded by the management. Private schools can further be bifurcated into the categories of elite private schools, which have tuition fees of over INR 3,000 per month, and budget private schools, which usually charge tuition fees in the range of INR 250-1,000 per month.<sup>4</sup>

In the endeavour to understand and compare incentives in operation in schools under these different management structures, fifty five teachers and seven head teachers were interviewed across a sample of four elite private schools, three budget private schools, three government schools and one government-aided school in Delhi.

### 3.2 Limitations of the Study

Given time and resource constraints, it was difficult to increase the number of schools covered within each category or to expand the geographical area that the study covered. Consequently, this is a localised study that provides an insight into the existing teacher incentives faced by a

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<sup>4</sup> **Budget Private Schools today constitute a very large proportion of private schools in India and are usually run and funded by an individual. They cater to children from financially deprived background and are usually located in underdeveloped parts of urban and rural areas.**

small sample of school teachers in Delhi. Further research is needed before the findings and recommendations described here can be taken to be applicable across India.

#### 4. Incentive Structures in Operation

The Sixth Pay Commission specifies the salary structure and allowances for a teacher in government schools.<sup>5</sup> Following the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission, there was a substantial increase in the salary structures of teachers. Pay for a government school teacher is determined in accordance with the grades for a government employee and all pay bands have an annual increment of 2.5 percent. There are certain features of a government job that may attract one to become a government teacher. Firstly, a government job has the benefit of unparalleled job security given that it is a permanent job. Secondly, as government employees, teachers are entitled to 3 National Holidays, 14 Gazetted Holidays and can avail up to 2 Restricted Holidays in a year. Additionally, as civilian government employees they are allowed 8 days Casual Leave, 20 days' Half Pay Leave (which can be commuted to Medical Leave) and Earned Leave of 30 days.<sup>6</sup> Thirdly, they receive Dearness Allowance, an increment in pay to protect the real value of salary which is positively correlated to inflation. This is paid twice a year and is around 5-10 percent of the total pay.

Many elite private schools also follow the same salary structure for teachers as in government schools but here teachers often have a probation period of one to two years before being made permanent. It is important to note that these features act as incentives for one to become a teacher but not necessarily a good teacher. Economically speaking, these are features that will expand the pool of applicants for the job of a teacher but they do not also necessarily act as incentives to improve performance or teacher effort of the existing teachers. In budget private schools the salary structure varies amongst schools and is determined at the discretion of the school leader. Teachers are hired on contractual basis with few permanent teachers. Some budget private schools also use performance-related pay.

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<sup>5</sup> (Report of the Sixth Central Pay Commission 2008)

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

## 5. Findings

### 5.1 Monetary Incentives

#### Salary

Salary for government school teachers is considerably higher than teachers in private schools. In the budget private schools covered in this study, the salary for teachers was as low as INR 2,000 and as high as INR 15,000 per month. In government schools, the starting salary for a primary and secondary teacher was reported to be INR 27,000 and INR 32,000 respectively and it was found that senior secondary teachers received over INR 60,000 per month. Although elite private schools were hesitant to provide precise data on salaries, few teachers interviewed in government schools who previously taught at elite private schools reported that their salaries were higher as a government employee.

It was interesting to note that despite this marked difference in teacher salaries under these three different managements, virtually all the teachers interviewed reported being satisfied with the salaries paid. Government school teachers were satisfied because they are getting comparatively the highest salaries in this profession, private teachers were satisfied with the pay and other incentives they received and teachers at budget private schools were satisfied because they were able to gain experience working as teachers without the formal qualifications that other schools require for hiring them. This means that increasing salaries is not necessary for improving teacher motivation. An implication of this is that government schools are not being very efficient by offering comparatively the highest salaries.

#### Promotions

Promotions mark an increase in responsibilities and salary. Promotions in government schools take a very long time and are based on seniority rather than merit. All government school teachers reported that the job involved a lot of stagnancy with the minimum number of years without a promotion on average being 5-12 years. It was also found that there are strict age requirements to become a principal with the minimum number of years of experience required being 22-25. In elite private schools teachers reported that promotions were rare. In budget private schools, principals acknowledged that there was limited scope for promotion.

Therefore the lack of scope for promotion attached to the job of a teacher regardless of the management structure is a marked disincentive. The stagnancy in job title, position and salary can be demotivating for any employee and a teacher here is no exception. Since promotions also help raise one's status in society, long delays associated with these or the absence of these

can be professionally and personally dissatisfying, naturally affecting one's dedication towards work. Increasing the scope for and lowering the time taken for promotions can raise job satisfaction which may in turn lead teachers to exert more teaching effort.

### **Performance-related Pay**

Performance of a teacher can be assessed by looking at absenteeism, teaching pedagogies, student test scores and feedback from students, parents and fellow teaching staff. Performance-related pay can be used to incentivise teachers to improve their performance assessed according to any one or all of the aforementioned parameters.

Although teachers in government and elite private schools reported the absence of a performance-related pay scheme, budget private schools have recently started using this. One of these schools in our sample introduced performance-linked pay in addition to the annual INR 200 increment in pay for all teachers. Under this scheme, teachers are asked to set own targets with regard to where they want to see their children in three months and if these are achieved teachers are rewarded by an additional payment. Apart from this, performance review of teachers is also done based on yearly student results, art of handling the class taking into account behaviour and complaints and evaluation from parents.

Another budget private school developed a mechanism to decrease teacher absenteeism which was highlighted to be a significant concern. Charts on teacher behaviour measured by punctuality, ability to deal with students, parents and fellow teachers were prepared and teachers were graded daily on each of these aspects. In a month, a total score out of 154 was calculated. The best teacher was awarded with an increase of 20 percent in salary which was above the 10 percent increase in salary for all teachers. This incentive was reported to have worked extremely well in improving attendance.

Performance-linked pay can also be tried in government and elite private schools to reward teachers. Teachers in both these types of schools believed that such a system would be fairer than a uniform increment in pay and would incentivise them to improve continuously.

## **5.2 Non-monetary Incentives**

### **Recognition**

Recognition was reported to be a significant motivator. Receiving appreciation for their work and effort by the principal in staff meetings and assemblies, getting the opportunity to go on exchange programs to observe teaching pedagogies adopted in other countries and having a

say in management decisions were some of the ways of recognising and rewarding sincerity and commitment of the teacher in elite private schools. In budget private schools teachers were given the opportunity to attend seminars and workshops to learn and share ideas on effective teaching pedagogies. One of the budget private schools had a 'Best Teacher of the Month' award through which teachers were awarded diaries, CDs with inspirational quotes or any such item which also aids teaching. Teachers at government schools, however, felt that there was limited recognition for good work from the principal's side. They highlighted the need for some kind of a written recognition from authorities and a mechanism to identify a good teacher based on their performance.

Hence recognition was identified to be a strong incentive for teachers to improve and continue to teach well. It can help set examples for fellow staff members and can be a relatively inexpensive way to keep teachers motivated. Private schools, especially budget private schools, seem to be utilising this method successfully to incentivise teachers.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

A monitoring and evaluation system was found to be in place in schools under all the management structures though it differed in nature and form across these schools. In government schools, teachers are evaluated through the Annual Confidential Report. It consists of three sections filled by the teacher, principal and the management. On the basis of student pass rates, teachers are graded as 'poor', 'satisfactory', 'good', 'very good' or 'excellent'. In order to get promoted, a teacher needs at least a 'good' or above for five consecutive years. Before the report is submitted to the management a teacher must be notified of the grade he/she is given. However, despite the existence of this evaluation mechanism, government schools lack an effective monitoring system. When principals were asked how they assessed the grade for a teacher, student test scores were mentioned as the evaluation criterion as opposed to the teacher behaviour, attendance or punctuality. In most cases, principals stated that they just knew how the teacher was performing without being able to elaborate on this or justify the grade they gave. This introduces the potential for a bias, as favouritism instead of performance may influence the evaluation of a teacher.

In elite private schools, teachers' performance was gauged by the principal by looking at student performance, conducting classroom inspections, checking whether the assigned tasks were completed within the deadlines set and in some cases, using regular student feedback. One effective way of collecting student feedback noted was where a student summarises how the class was conducted and whether homework was assigned in a register which the teacher has to sign in presence of the child. This register was reviewed by the principal on a regular

basis and teachers were given warnings if the student feedback highlighted any problems in teaching methods or teacher behaviour.

In few budget private schools, the principal monitored teachers using CCTV cameras and through unannounced visits to the classroom. Announced visits to classrooms were also made since principals reported that teachers were motivated to teach well when they were being observed. Sometimes visits were announced but not made—a trick employed by one of the principals which was found to work equally well. Student feedback, especially from the relatively weaker students in class, was also taken into account to evaluate teachers. One budget private school also used an open evaluation system where teachers were graded daily on their attendance, punctuality and performance. Teachers at this school reported that although earlier they had adopted a negative outlook towards such a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system, seeing the subsequent improvement in teachers' attendance and effort along with encouraging and constructive feedback they receive from the principal, they now see this as an effective and healthy manner for them to improve.

Teacher absence was less of a problem in elite private schools since these had electronic clock-in systems which could monitor attendance. Teachers at elite private schools reported that their salaries were deducted for any leaves they took outside of those permitted. Principals in budget private schools reported that teacher absence was an important concern at their schools. To counteract this BPS schools had adopted good monitoring systems for attendance and mandated that any absence should be informed. Principals at budget private schools personally inspected and recorded teacher attendance. Teachers at budget private schools reported that they were given warnings if their attendance was poor and after three warnings they could be fired. At one budget private school, a teacher's salary was deducted by INR 60 for every absence above those permitted.

At government schools, teachers had to sign a register for confirming their attendance but they reported that it was easy for them to fake attendance if the principal was not vigilant and the result for persistent poor attendance was a memo at most. There were no repercussions and hence no opportunity cost for not attending the school. This accounts for the high absenteeism rates in government schools found in earlier studies. Government schools therefore need to adopt a system to disincentivise teachers from taking too many leaves.

Therefore effective and regular monitoring along with evaluation and constructive feedback can incentivise teachers to teach well. While government schools lack a regular monitoring system, private schools are using this relatively successfully to improve and maintain teaching standards.

## **Pupil-teacher Ratio**

Pupil teacher ratio (PTR) was found to be the lowest in budget private schools where it ranges from 21:1 to 25:1. In government schools, PTR was in the range of 25:1 to 29:1 whereas in elite private schools, the ratio was higher at around 40:1. However, it is important to note that PTR differed significantly from the average class size in government and elite private schools. In one elite private school, teachers reported that class size reduced from 50 to 35 as students moved to higher classes. Teachers stated that special attention needs to be given to each student in disciplines like languages and that a large class size makes this very difficult. Some teachers also reported that it was difficult to handle large class sizes especially for younger ages.

In government schools, PTR is very misleading. Principal at one MCD school reported that due to teacher absenteeism, classes were combined so that one teacher would teach classes 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>, another 3<sup>rd</sup> while another 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup>. Teachers found it difficult to teach well in this multi-grade teaching system. Average class sizes were as high as 63. In budget private schools class sizes and PTR were similar.

A large class size makes it very difficult for the teacher to monitor each and every child, making it very difficult, if not impossible, to cater to needs of all students. Class sizes in government and elite private schools must be reduced which would make it easier for a teacher to teach and help each and every child in the classroom.

## **Administrative Duties**

Government school teachers were very dissatisfied with the non-teaching duties they are required to carry out. These involve (a) opening bank accounts for students so that money that students receive from the government for buying stationery and uniforms is transferred directly to the students; (b) filling registers manually as computers are dysfunctional or teachers are not well versed with using them; (c) census data collection (d) election duty prior to which teachers are also required to attend three to four days of training. Teachers described these duties as cumbersome and a distraction from teaching. They were dissatisfied at being unable to complete the syllabus as students received less attention and teaching time owing to the time spent in fulfilling these administrative duties. As these duties were often assigned to teachers who taught lower grades, teachers complained that this also created non-uniform distribution of workload which they considered unfair. The day when teachers at MCD schools were interviewed, an audit which occurs once every five years was expected. Teachers and principals were busy reviewing the registers, checking to see if anything was missing and students were left without much teaching during the course of the day.

Non-teaching activities in elite private schools only involved organising competitions and celebrations for festivals, the duties which were given to teachers in turns or chosen by the teachers on a voluntary basis. Teachers appreciated these as this gave them an opportunity to do something aside from the regular teaching and did not consider these to be a burden. Teachers at budget private schools stated that they had no other duties apart from teaching.

Hence government school teachers need to be relieved of their administrative duties which act as a disincentive and a hindrance for them to devote more time to teaching.

### **Specialisation of Teachers**

Having to teach subjects outside of their expertise often was reported to be a major disincentive for teachers. Teachers in MCD schools and budget private schools were assigned a class to teach and were required to teach all subjects to them without a consideration of the teacher's speciality and interest. It was reported that this was demotivating and unfulfilling since they were aware that the quality of the education they imparted was poor in certain subject areas. Teachers at MCD schools also noted the need for specialised teachers for teaching non-academic lessons such as dance, music, art and craft. Allowing specialisation can therefore help teachers avoid teaching subjects they do not want to and thus simultaneously improve the quality of the education imparted.

### **Support and Recognition from Parents**

Lack of support and recognition from parents of students was also reported to be a disincentive to teach. Teachers at one MCD school reported that given that students at their school came from very deprived backgrounds, many parents prefer to engage their children in labour work to earn rather than attend school. They consequently did not appreciate teachers' efforts in educating their child. Teachers at a government secondary school reported that parents could not monitor whether their child was completing his/her homework as many could not read or write and were completely dependent on teachers for educating their child.

Teachers at elite private schools reported that parents were very demanding and expected spoon-feeding for their child. As students increasingly took private tuitions, parents perceived private tutors to be playing a more important role in their child's education. At budget private schools principals reported that parents cared for the education that their child was receiving and any complaints from parents were addressed immediately. Parental evaluation and feedback for the teaching imparted was welcomed. Principals reported that parents were appreciative and even requested to introduce more classes and expand intake of students. Since all teachers at budget private schools were local and lived in the same community as the

students, they also reported being motivated by the good reputation they had within the community.

Therefore teachers significantly valued appreciation from parents in return for their endeavour to teach well. Appreciation from parents can be another inexpensive but nonetheless a very strong motivator for teachers.

### **Employment Terms**

As government employees, teachers in government schools have permanent jobs and cannot be easily fired. Whilst this job security can help the teacher to feel secure about his/her future and hence focus efforts on teaching rather than constantly look for jobs at other schools, for the fear of losing their job, in reality, the permanency of this job has become a disincentive for teachers to teach well. Principals in government schools do not have the autonomy to fire the teachers if they are not performing well or if their attendance is poor. At most, teachers can be given memos or can be transferred. This combined with poor monitoring and evaluation prevents a teacher from being proactive, looking to improve or maintain teaching standards.

Teachers in elite private schools do have permanent contracts but the principals have the autonomy to fire them if they fail to improve after several warnings. This along with regular monitoring and evaluation incentivises them to perform well. In budget private schools, all teachers are on contracts and can be fired any time if they are not performing well. Likewise, this incentivises them to continue performing to the best of their ability.

The Sixth Pay Commission encourages hiring of such contractual employees as and when required in the government sector. This gives the opportunity for young graduates to enrol for teaching simultaneously tackling the rising youth unemployment. Government contract teachers had similar teaching duties and workload as regular teachers but were exempt from performing any administrative duties. Their pay is around INR 18,000 which is under a third of the pay of regular government teachers. This disparity can be very demotivating but at the same time teachers on a contract have a greater incentive to teach well given the fear of their contract not being renewed otherwise. Hiring teachers on a contract basis which is renewed based on the performance of the teacher can therefore be an effective way to incentivise teachers to continue teaching well throughout their career.

### **Travel Distance to School**

Teachers at government schools usually lived close to the school, usually within 5-10 kilometres of the school with the travel time taken usually ranging from 10 to 30 minutes. Teachers at

budget private schools lived in the surrounding area of the school at a distance of less than a kilometre from the school taking them less than five minutes to get to schools. Teachers at elite private schools lived further from the schools with the travel distance ranging from 2-20 kilometres. Travel times for teachers in elite private schools were sometimes over an hour. However, despite this teachers did not consider it as a disincentive and regarded the working environment at school a much more important factor in guiding their decision to continue teaching at the school.

### **Autonomy**

Teachers mentioned that the amount of flexibility they had with regard to the content, method of teaching and the time period within which they had to cover a certain topic influenced their enthusiasm for teaching. Teachers at MCD schools reported that they enjoyed having the autonomy to adopt any teaching pedagogy they saw fit to deliver the lessons and did not feel pressurised to cover the syllabus. However, teachers at secondary government schools and elite private schools reported having limited autonomy with regard to the content and time to cover this and felt rushed to meet the syllabus requirements. In addition to this, teachers felt that the implementation of Continuous and Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE) which requires continuous assessments based on student activities had significantly increased their workload. They highlighted that this was especially problematic in government schools since students could not afford the resources required for undertaking activities. Teachers therefore found the CCE system difficult to implement practically, even though they supported the idea of assessing students on aspects other than academic criterion.

In budget private schools, teachers appreciated the fact that they were not judged solely on the basis of students' results but more on their commitment towards the role, curiosity to learn and creativity in teaching. They stated that this gave them the liberty to experiment with different teaching methods and learn more about effective teaching practices themselves via experimentation.

Therefore, all teachers appreciated having some autonomy with regard to the delivery of the syllabus content though teachers at government and elite private schools disliked the restrictions on their teaching pedagogies that CCE implied.

## 6. Recommendations

Based on the findings of this paper and taking into account teachers' perspective, the following recommendations are made with the objective of improving teacher motivation and the quality of the education.

### 6.1 For the Government

- i. Training for all school principals must be introduced in order to familiarise them with effective monitoring and evaluation methods
- ii. Government school teachers should not be required to undertake non-teaching clerical duties and the government should recruit additional personnel for these
- iii. Develop a career ladder for teachers wherein promotions are quicker and conditional on performance rather than seniority
- iv. Hire teachers on contractual basis whereby contracts are renewed conditional on the teacher's performance
- v. Give the autonomy to principals and school managements in government schools to hire and fire teachers
- vi. Reduce the number of activities required under CCE and ensure that children are provided with all the materials needed for these free of cost

### 6.2 For Schools

- i. Introduce performance-linked pay
- ii. Conduct regular, anonymous student and parent reviews of teachers
- iii. Introduce monitoring and evaluation systems which ensure teacher accountability
- iv. Develop a career ladder for teachers clearly laying out the criteria for promotion
- v. Ensure that teachers are required to teach only those subjects which match their expertise and interest
- vi. Recognise and appreciate teachers for their efforts, enthusiasm and creativity in teaching
- vii. Introduce teachers to different ways of delivering information encouraging them to experiment with these and evaluate their effectiveness in conveying information to students
- viii. Foster exchange of successful and effective teaching practices
- ix. Teachers from government, elite private and budget private schools should be encouraged to jointly discuss the problems they face and to come up with practical and implementable solutions
- x. Organise forums for parents and other community members to obtain their views on best teaching practices

### 6.3 For the Civil Society

- i. Parents should endeavour to monitor the child's progress and should be proactive in sending feedback, positive or otherwise, on a teacher's performance and behaviour with children and parents
- ii. Foster debates and discussions on the philosophy of education to encourage the community to reflect on the meaning and importance of education
- iii. Further research should be encouraged on other incentives that can be used to motivate teachers

## 7. Conclusion

A teacher makes an invaluable contribution to society by educating the next generation and therefore it is vital to develop a holistic understanding of the factors that can motivate a teacher. The introduction of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE) in 2009, which pledges to provide free education to 6-14 year olds, has been an important step towards achieving the goal of universal education in India. However, the quality of education remains a matter of pressing concern with high teacher absenteeism. Motivating teachers firstly to come to work and secondly to teach with effort and care, duties which in fact characterise their job, is a challenging but critical area that needs to be addressed.

This paper contributes to this area by presenting teachers' views on factors which motivate or demotivate them. Maintaining an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism with repercussions for poor performance, introducing a performance related pay system and hiring teachers on contractual basis are three key recommendations the paper makes, noting that performance of the teacher should not only be judged by student scores but also include aspects of attendance, punctuality, commitment, creativity and enthusiasm.

## Annexure

### Head Teacher Survey

Date:

Type of school:

1. Pupil Teacher Ratio = Total no. of students/Total no. of teachers
2. What is the range of salary the teachers are paid?
3. What is the hiring procedure used?
4. What are the hiring criteria?
5. What is incentive structure currently in place/benefits available to teachers?
  - Performance related pay
  - Holidays
  - Promotion criterion
  - Free meals
  - Reduced school fees for their children
  - Other:
6. What do you think is the motivation level of teachers on a scale of 1-5?
7. What is the school doing to improve on it?
8. What is the monitoring and evaluation system in place?
9. What sets your school apart from the others?
10. How many teachers have you hired in the last 5 years and how many have you fired in the last 5 years (with reasons)?
11. What is the average tenure of contract when you hire teachers?

### Teacher Survey

1. What subjects do you teach?
2. How many classes do you teach?
3. How long have you been working in this school?
4. How many days are you required to work?
5. How far do you travel to get to school every day? (approximate kilometres)
6. How long does it take you to travel to work? (minutes)
7. What are the major impediments for teaching?
8. How many holidays are you permitted and how many did you take last year?
9. Are you happy with the work load (responsibilities) you currently have? Do you think it is uniform across all teachers?
10. Why did you choose to become a teacher? Why did you choose to teach in this school?
11. Are you happy with the incentive structure in place? What changes would you suggest, if any?
12. What are your future/career aspirations?

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