The report argues that street vendors who are expressly recognised and protected by the Street Vendors Act 2014 continue to be stigmatized as “encroachers” and face the usual official and unofficial consequences including extortion, harassment and evictions. State apparatus has not fully implemented the law in most states. Moreover, by evicting the vendors and creating novending zones before enumeration, state authorities as well as local administrations have been in clear conflict with the law. Unfortunately, the courts have mostly sided with the government and upheld evictions.
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Street vending is typically self-regulated by informal but codified norms of space allocation. Vendors, in most cases, allocate/occupy spots based on the rule of first possession. Kettles (2006) argues self-regulation brings efficiency and reduces conflicts through the identification of “valuable” revenue-generating vending sites. For the administration, such self-regulation reduces the burden to identify and allocate vending spots. More importantly, formalising existing informal practices increases compliance, reducing the need for enforcement.
In this article, we deal with a question central to urban planning: How should the Indian government, in light of Street Vendors Act 2014, formalise and allocate of rights to public spaces?
Recap of Street Vendors Act 2014
The Street Vendors Act 2014 seeks to formalize the existing space allocation to a great extent instead of allocating de novo. It attempts to formalize all existing vendors and prohibits declaring existing natural markets into no-vending zones. The Act necessitates the formation of a local governance body, called the Town Vending Committee (TVC), responsible for the regulation of vendors. The Committee is mandated to survey all vendors and issue Certificates of Vending (CoV) to all identified vendors.
The central problem is ultimately determining a method to the madness around the use of public spaces such that interests of all parties, especially vendors, are met. Put another way, this requires some process to determine and assign user rights to vendors.
Formalising vendors will require formalising usufructuary vending rights
The Act approaches the question of assigning property rights, particularly user rights to a particular spot, to vendors in conflicting terms. On the one hand, Section 29(1) expressly declares that the Act confers no “temporary, permanent or perpetual right of carrying out vending activities in the vending zones allotted to him or in respect of any place on which he carries on such vending activity.”
On the other hand, section 5(1)(c), for example, mentions a condition of non-transferability for issuance of CoV. This condition prohibits the transfer of CoV, rent or even the place specified in the CoV to any other person. It implies, place of vending is ‘specific’ and it is to be specified in the CoV.
Three aspects of implementation require careful attention
First, while the Act protects existing vendors by requiring local governments to accommodate them until the upper limit of 2.5% of the local population is reached, it leaves the determination of holding capacity, applicable to new vendors, to the local authority. The principles the state government lays out in determining the formula for calculating holding capacity will determine how inclusive or accommodative the local government will be of new vendors.
Second, if the demand for CoV from existing vendors and new applicants exceeds the holding capacity, the Act suggests carrying out a draw of lots. While section 4(3) of the Act seems to equate existing and new vendors, we recommend prioritising existing vendors over new applicants. The manner in which state governments balance the demands of existing and new applicants, especially when it exceeds holding capacity and 2.5% of the population, have implications on vendor livelihoods and urban space management.
Third, the Act is ambiguous on whether or not to assign property rights to a specific spot to a vendor. There may be different ways to approach this: allocation of exclusive rights to a site to the vendor, allocation on the time-sharing basis (in a day, month, or season) or allocation of an area without specifying the vending site. Each of these policy choices has pros and cons, and has a bearing on the degree of vendor formalisation.
Editor’s Note: The authors published a much more extensive report on the Street Vendors Act of 2014 titled “Progress Report: Implementing the Street Vendors Act 2014”available on Centre for Civil Society’s website at https://tinyurl.com/y4bywn6o. For more information about Centre for Civil Society, please visit their main website at https://www.ccs.in/.
Street vending is a source of livelihood for many urban poor, and of affordable and essential goods to the public. In India, stories of vendor harassment by the local administration as well as the police are ubiquitous. It appears to be less about vendor rights and more about the power that different actors exercise over public spaces.
One must look at the process whereby a new hawker enters the trade . . . Then starts the bargain with the local policeman, the municipal recovery inspector, the influential (known) hawker-cum-leader and even the local goon for permission to engage in hawking activity at a particular location . . . A similar negotiation takes place for erecting a hut in a slum locality…payment to be made to the slumlord (a volunteer of some political party)…expected to be a part of the vote bank of the concerned political party. Subsequent hafta payments continue unless the hawker becomes politically active, or joins the local mafia . . .(note 1)
There are several issues at the heart of the street vending debate and assigning rights over the use of public space is the most contentious. A vendor’s right to occupation, for example, conflicts with commuters’ rights to move freely. The central policy problem is managing such conflicting and competing interests of vendors, pavement users, local residents, vehicular traffic and urban space managers.
- R. N. Sharma, “The Politics of Urban Space,” India Seminar, accessed September 4, 2019, https://tinyurl.com/y673pbju.
Separation of Powers is one of the foremost principles of good governance, and states that the rule-maker, rule-executor and adjudicator should be distinct from each other. Such a separation installs checks against conflicts of interest and abuse of power by regulatory authorities and increases institutional accountability for outcomes.
We need to separate the functions exercised in governing the school education sector of India, particularly at the state level. A state government's Education Department is responsible for the construction of schools, teacher hiring and management, distribution of funds for school activities and formulation of state-level education policy.
The blueprint identifies three key-problems with the current governance structure:
- Violation of natural justice;
- Ineffective performance monitoring and rule compliance; and
- Differential laws for government and private schools.
To address these three problems, the blueprint proposes separating the functions of service-delivery, assessment of learning outcomes, and adjudication of disputes (from the state departments of education) into three independent bodies.
Prior to the passage of the Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009, government registration or recognition of private schools was not mandatory in most Indian states. The Act has drawn heavy criticism for its impact on recognised and unrecognised private schools across India. Its uniform input-oriented regulatory approach does not pay attention to the fact that children from all socioeconomic classes attend private schools. Application of uniform principles to all schools, irrespective of the fee charged, ignores the costs of compliance with the mandated input norms, and the implicit penalty imposed on low-income parents. Worst of all, the enforcement of the Act threatens to shut down well-performing schools who may not have the means to comply with input norms.
Nearly 10 years after the passage of the Act, we are yet to have credible estimates from the government on the regulatory impact of RTE, particularly on children attending low-fee private schools.
Against this backdrop, the report provides estimates on the extent of school closures as a result of enforcing private school recognition norms prescribed under RTE.
The debate on low learning levels has spurred several actions by the state. India has enrolled to participate in the 2021 round of PISA. The NCERT has defined grade level learning outcomes for languages (Hindi, English, Urdu), mathematics, environmental studies, science and social science up to the elementary stage. NITI Aayog is developing an index to `institutionalise the focus on improving education outcomes' including learning, equity and access based on information generated by NAS, the largest national assessment survey in the country. NAS coverage has been expanded to include government-aided schools and the sampling unit is changed from state to district level. The moot question is: Are these reforms sufficient to bring improvement across schools or are we still just tinkering at the edges?
Taking note of the crisis and recent developments, this brief urges the government to use the power of information to strengthen its ability to hold individual schools accountable, parents' ability to choose, and schools' ability to improve.
For more information on the project, to share your feedback or to get involved, get in touch with us at email@example.com.
An estimated one crore people in India rely on street vending for their livelihoods, supplying affordable and essential goods to the public and contributing directly to economic growth. However, they operate in public spaces over which different stakeholders claim contrasting and competing interests. In addition, a lack of clarity on their rights encourages informal governance and allows local authorities to benefit from flourishing channels of rent-seeking.
The Central Government, in a landmark event, enacted the Street Vendors Act 2014 with the objective of protecting and regulating the street vendors of the country. The Act mandates states to create rules, schemes and local governance structures, in consonance with the spirit of the Central Act, to legitimize the rights of vendors.
This report evaluates the progress made in institutionalizing mechanisms to protect and regulate vending since the past four years. There are three parts to the report: a look at the interpretation of the Act by the Higher Courts, a statistical capture of the progress by states in implementing the Act, and a case study of two urban cities to explore how the new Act is reshaping urban space management.
Through an analysis of 57 court judgements, RTI responses on 11 questions from 30 states, and review of orders and meeting minutes of 2 Town Vending Committees, we found that the Act notwithstanding, vendors continue to be excluded from critical urban space management decisions. Four years after enactment, progress across the board on implementing the mandate of the Act is sluggish.
The government has the power to write rules, apply standards, recognise schools, withdraw recognition, and resolve disputes. Our paper teases out the discretionary powers conferred to the state governments for the regulation of education. We study the use of discretionary powers at three touchpoints—the government as a licensor, fee regulator and inspector of private schools.
What did we find?
We find evidence of excesses in the exercise of discretionary powers by the executive—the state education department. Below, we have listed a few instances:
Rigid and intrusive rules that some would argue are ultra vires: There are three key regulatory requirements to open a school in Delhi (Figure 1). Rule 44 of Delhi School Education Rules 1973 authorises the state Administrator to decide if the new school is necessary for the area. This objective has taken the form of an Essentiality Certificate. The Essentiality Certificate, however, does not have a statutory basis in Delhi School Education Act 1973, nor in the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009.
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Figure 1: Three regulatory requirements needed for opening a school in Delhi
Proving that a school is essential in an area does not feature in DSEA 1973 or RTE 2009. It only finds a mention in DSER 1973, a glaring instance of quasi-legislative discretionary excess.
Ad-hoc and arbitrary rule-making: Rule 192 of DSER 1973 states that every inspection should 'be as objective as possible'. A close reading of the proforma that objectivity is a far fetched dream, especially when it comes to academic supervision.
Figure 2 highlights some of the constructs used to evaluate the academic quality of the school.
The first principle of a good questionnaire is to avoid ambiguous/abstract and loaded terms. The question "Were the questions put to the students thought-provoking and well-distributed?" is an example of the former and "Is it (homework) regularly corrected and followed-up?" is an example of the latter.
The absence of objective measures and defined standards for compliance raise many questions: Is evaluation solely dependent on the interpretation of the inspecting officer? If a school gets positive notes on some aspects and negative on others, where does that leave a school? Are reports of different schools comparable?
Poor procedural fidelity and absent transparency on procedures followed: Higher courts in India have in many judgments pronounced an aversion to the commercialisation of education but allowed schools to retain a 'reasonable surplus'. By default, the determination of what would count as a reasonable surplus is left to the administrative machinery.
In 2018, the Directorate of Education in Delhi passed an order instructing all districts to form a Fee Anomaly Committee, as a forum to attend to the complaints of parents. Yet, Fee Anomaly Committees have either not been formed or are defunct.
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Figure 2: Inspection proforma — Constructs evaluated and ways of measurement
Parents report that officials often fail to register complaints or take punitive action against schools who do not comply with orders. Given the lack of any codified procedure for processing complaints and limited transparency, it is often difficult for parents to establish a clear complaint trail and follow up.
The Uttar Pradesh Self-Financed Independent Schools (Fee Regulation) Act 2018 regulates fee for schools that charge an annual fee of over Rs 20,000. We found that the fee regulation committees only make decision summaries of its decisions available rather than the full minutes.
Inconsistent and subjective exercise of punitive measures: Section 24(3) of DSEA 1973 authorises the Director to issue instructions to the school manager 'to rectify any defect or deficiency found at the time of inspection or otherwise in the working of the school'. If the 'manager fails to comply with any direction given', then the Director may take any action including— (a) stoppage of aid, (b) withdrawal of recognition, or (c) except in the case of a minority school, taking over of the school'. From this, two challenges emerge.
First, the Director has a free hand in taking any action as deems fit to her if a school fails to comply with any direction. Further, there is no escalation—one mistake and your recognition may be at risk. Second, implementation is skewed—although the Act gives the power to the Director to act as she wishes, measures higher up on the penalty ladder are rarely used.
Learnings for future
Part of these excesses is borne of the lack of documented guidance on how the department should exercise its functions. Others are violations of the letter of the law, sometimes for the understandable reason of limited state capacity. These necessitate the establishment of norms that constrain the actions of those in positions of authority and determining who should be accountable to whom and for what (Posani and Aiyar 2009).
The administrative architecture needs to distinguish and separate the government's role as regulator, service provider, financier, and assessor. Even if full functional separation is a long term endeavour, an independent grievance redressal mechanism is an immediate need to balance executive discretion (Centre for Civil Society 2019).
India, one of the largest democracies in the world with an ever-rising population, has had, several statutes that with the advent of time have become obsolete, redundant or repetitive. In addition to this, there is the matter of inconsistent language and dissemination- making it difficult for an ordinary citizen to access and comprehend the plethora of legal information with ease. This increased transaction cost coupled with glaring redundancy further breeds fertile grounds for corruption, discouraging engagement of individuals and firms with the society/ economy at large.
Centre of Civil Society (CCS) initiated the 'Repeal of 100 Laws' Project in 2014 with the aim to identify laws that could be repealed on account of three reasons
- Obsolescence in the face of new laws
- Hindrance to development, governance and freedom.
For the 2018 edition of the Repeal of Laws initiative the following state compendiums have been prepared:
- Assam - Symbiosis Law School (SLS), Noida
- Gujarat - Gujarat National Law University(GNLU), Gandhinagar
- Meghalaya - The National Academy of Legal Studies & Research (NALSAR), Hyderabad
- Mizoram - National law School of India University(NLSIU), Bangalore
- Tripura - National law School of India University(NLSIU), Bangalore
- Jammu & Kashmir - University of Jammu, Jammu
APPEAL FOR REPEAL LAW DAY
Centre for Civil Society, in an effort to institutionalize the repealing of laws as a constitutional practice for the Republic of India, brought together like-minded organizations, scholars, academicians and lawyers to acknowledge 26 November as the Appeal for Repeal Law Day. Its objectives were:
- To celebrate the diversity of our legal system and have a constructive dialogue around the process of repealing of laws
- To launch the compendiums constituting the recommended laws for repeal in the aforementioned 6 States
To mark this day, we launched the Repeal Law Compendiums constituting the recommended laws for repeal in the aforementioned 6 States. The launch was followed by a panel discussion on ‘Exploring Alternatives: Institutionalization of Repeal of Laws’. Our esteemed speakers for the panel consisted of India’s prominent legal and industry experts such as PK Malhotra, Former Law Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice, Maneesh Chhibber, Editor (Investigations and Special Projects), The Print, Satya Prakash, Legal Editor, The Tribune, Tariq Anwar, Former Union Minister, Hemant Batra, Founder and Chairman, Kaden Boriss Global and Neeti Shikha, National Coordinator, Repeal of Laws initiative, Centre for Civil Society.